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Abstract Using a sample of Chinese listed firms for the
period of 2004–2010, this study examines the impact of
religion on corporate philanthropic giving. Based on hand-
collected data of religion and corporate philanthropic giv-
ing, we provide strong and robust evidence that religion is
significantly positively associated with Chinese listed
firms’ philanthropic giving. This finding is consistent with
the view that religiosity has remarkable effects on indi-
vidual thinking and behavior, and can serve as social norms
to influence corporate philanthropy. Moreover, religion and
corporate philanthropic giving have a significantly weaker
(less pronounced) positive association for state-owned
enterprises than for non-state-owned enterprises. The
results are robust to a variety of sensitivity tests. Our results
highlight religious influence on corporate philanthropic
giving in contemporary China, an old traditional country
with a typical communist economy.
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Introduction
Corporate philanthropic giving has drawn a great deal of
attention from researchers (Vaidyanathan 2008). Extant
studies, especially those published in the Journal of Busi-
ness Ethics, focus on the determinations and economic
consequences of corporate philanthropy (e.g., File and
Prince 1998; Gao et al. 2012; Sánchez 2000; Mitschow
2000; MacDonald et al. 2002; Morris et al. 2003; Williams
2003; Brammer and Millington 2005; Choi and Wang
2007; Chen et al. 2008; Patten 2008; Crampton and Patten
2008; Zhang et al. 2009; Amato and Amato 2012; Maas
and Liket 2011). To our knowledge, however, previous
literature has rarely examined religious influence on cor-
porate philanthropic giving.
China’s religious tradition has a long history. Taoism,
the indigenous religion, originated nearly 1,900 years ago.
Religious belief, important in Chinese philosophy, has
deep roots and serves to fill the spiritual vacuum as Chinese
people face today’s fast-paced and changing society. In the
past 35 years since the Chinese government took a new
proactive approach to religious activities, religion has
blossomed, flourished, and far outpaced expectations.
These observations motivate us to address religion’s
impact on corporate philanthropy.
Almost all world religions teach the value of charity as a
way of transferring wealth. Historically, two traditional and
influential religions, Buddhism and Taoism, have encour-
aged the Chinese to take care of others and forego personal
interests. Therefore, we expect that religion positively
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affects firms in making philanthropic decisions. In contrast
with US studies using county-level religiosity measure, our
study refers to Du (2012) and constructs quasi-firm-level
religious variables, measured as the number of nationally
famous religious sites, mostly Buddhist monasteries and
Taoist temples, within a certain radius around the firm’s
registered address. We collect data regarding religion and
corporate philanthropic giving and provide strong and
robust evidence that religion is significantly positively
associated with corporate philanthropic giving. Moreover,
the nature of the ultimate owner affects the positive asso-
ciation between religion and corporate philanthropy which
is significantly weakened and less-pronounced for state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) than for non-state-owned
enterprises (non-SOEs).
Our study contributes to the extant literature in the
following ways. First, to our knowledge, this study is the
first to address the concern about whether and how reli-
gion, as an important social norm, can influence corporate
decisions about philanthropic giving. Prior studies in
religion, psychology, and anthropology find that religion
powerfully affects individual thoughts and behaviors,
which then reverberates to enhance philanthropic behavior
(e.g., Angelidis and Ibrahim 2004; Conroy and Emerson
2004). Those studies provide little evidence, however,
about religious influence on corporate philanthropic
decisions, and we intend to fill that gap by addressing this
issue.
Second, our findings suggest that religion can serve as
an alternative mechanism to urge firms toward philan-
thropic giving in emerging markets like China where
business ethics are still evolving and dynamic. Although
traditional religion teaches that ‘‘helping others will benefit
you as well’’, many Chinese enterprises have not yet begun
to appreciate the value of corporate philanthropic giving
(Baskin 2006). Instead, they remain apathetic about cor-
porate philanthropy or fulfill their corporate philanthropy
in appearance rather than in substance. Our findings sug-
gest that religion, as a social norm, can facilitate Chinese
firms to assume their role in corporate philanthropy.
Third, our study considers the importance of the nature
of ultimate owners for moderating the positive association
between religion and corporate philanthropy. When
studying Chinese business operations, we must consider
that SOEs operate under a sensitive political environment.
We find that the divergent nature of ultimate owners dif-
ferentially influence corporate philanthropic giving, and
further religion and corporate philanthropy have a less-
pronounced positive association for SOEs. This finding
supplements some prior studies that solely investigate
administrative forces on corporate philanthropy in China’s
‘‘communist religious economy’’ (e.g., Gao et al. 2012;
Zhang et al. 2009).
Fourth, our study belongs to a very thin line of literature
seeking to measure firm-level religious variables. Our
measure can borrow support from findings that geographic
dissemination, distance, and characteristics have varying
information content (El Ghoul et al. 2012a; John et al.
2011; Loughran 2007; Du 2012). Previous studies (Hilary
and Hui 2009; McGuire et al. 2012; El Ghoul et al. 2012b)
adopt county or region-level religious measures that may
generate serious cross-sectional self-correlation of regres-
sion results (Wines and Napier 1992; Du 2012), but firm-
level religious variables can overcome such weaknesses.
Finally, our study is one of the very thin studies to
illuminate religion’s role in the behavior of Chinese listed
firms. Prior studies in this area focus mostly on the United
States, but there is an absence of persuasive evidence about
religious influence outside the United States although a few
studies address this issue (e.g., Bekkers 2003; Tao and Yeh
2007). Do religious social norms play an important role in
other less-developed market settings like China? Our study
fills these voids by examining whether and how religion,
particularly Buddhism and Taoism, influences philan-
thropic giving in Chinese listed firms. Recognizing that
China is the world’s second largest economy, our study
complements extant literature and provides additional
evidence about whether and how religions other than
Christianity have economic consequences.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Second section introduces institutional background and
develops research hypotheses. Third section introduces the
empirical models and the measure of religious variables.
Fourth section describes our sample and reports basic
descriptive statistics. Fifth and sixth sections present the
regression results and robustness checks, respectively. In
the final section, we present our conclusions.
Institutional Background and Hypotheses Development
Institutional Background
Buddhism and Taoism are the principal religions currently
registered in China. Buddhism is China’s oldest foreign
religion, while Taoism, indigenously Chinese, has a long
history. In 1949, Mao Zedong founded the People’s
Republic of China, following the philosophies of Marxism
and Leninism promoted in the former Soviet Union. The
Chinese Communist Party adopted atheism as a funda-
mental doctrine. During the Cultural Revolution from 1966
to 1976, religious activities were greatly curtailed. In 1979,
China began unprecedented reforms leading to more open
markets and allowing greater tolerance of diverse views
and practices. Of particular, relevance to our study, the
Chinese Communist Party realized that people had widely
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varying spiritual views and demands, and that religion can
never be eradicated.
Since the restrictions on religion loosened and reform
began, faith has grown significantly. In the 1980s, some
destroyed shrines were repaired. Temples, mosques, and
other sites were reopened for religious activities. Monks,
priests, nuns, and clergy reappeared to perform rituals, and
congregations began meeting for worship. Today religious
activities are flourishing beyond expectations, with some
Buddhist monasteries and Taoist temples crammed during
holidays and festivals. Scholars have begun to notice
China’s religious development (Ashiwa and Wank 2006;
Yang 2009) and have turned to the fundamental impetus:
the faith and devotion of the Chinese people (Overmyer
2003).
Nevertheless, knowing that Chinese Communist Party
members are inclined to atheism, doubts may remain about
religious influence in contemporary China. However,
‘‘China had 80.27 million Chinese Communist Party
members by the end of 2010 and they are inclined to
atheism, but more than 1.2 billion people have the right to
choose religious beliefs’’ (Du 2012). Moreover, 11 %
belong to a religion (World Values Survey 2007). How-
ever, the number may be somewhat underestimated
because of language or expression barriers (Yang 2009).
As of 2011, about 185 million people claim Buddhism
beliefs (Jin and Qiu 2011), and while 300 million may be
more accurate (e.g., Lim 2010).
Another argument is that famous religious shrines are
often so ancient that they are tourist attractions more than
places of worship, and that worship is very different from
tourism (Eliade 1959, 1969). Nevertheless, tourism and
pilgrimage cannot be said to be opposites (Turner and
Turner 1978); pilgrimage has historical origins as a form of
tourism (Sigaux 1966; Turner 1973; Cohen 1992, 2004;
Singh 2006). Scholars also address similarities between
worship and tourism (e.g., Adler 1989; Bar and Cohen-
Hattab 2003; Smith 1992), showing that secular pilgrimage
and sacred tourism are associated (Graburn 1977, 2001;
MacCannell 1976; Collins-Kreiner and Kliot 2000; Singh
2005). Therefore, we can rationally infer that pilgrimage
and tourism have increasingly blurred and convergent
boundaries (Cohen 1992; Smith 1992; Singh 2005).1
Obviously, traditional religious activity is rising in
modern Chinese society. Along with China’s economic
boom, materialism has rampantly polarized the rich and
poor. Consequently, people turn to traditions and religion
for comfort. This phenomenon triggers our interest in the
effects on business decisions, particularly on corporate
philanthropic giving.
Hypotheses Development
Philanthropy can enhance corporate image, reputation, and
even competitive advantage (Godfrey 2005; Porter and
Kramer 2002) although the relation between charitable
donations and financial performance is still inconclusive
(Margolis and Walsh 2001). Broadly, corporate social
responsibility (CSR) includes philanthropic corporate giv-
ing, based on the theory of corporate stakeholder view
(Carroll 1991). In fact, CSR does not contradict owners’
interests. For example, firms use the disclosure of CSR
activities to reduce equity costs (Dhaliwal et al. 2011).
The corporate stakeholder view coincides with most
religious teachings to uphold responsibilities. A survey of
473 Christian business students finds a positive relationship
between religiosity and ethical components of CSR
(Angelidis and Ibrahim 2004). Another study of 17,000
individuals from 20 countries shows that religious indi-
viduals appear to differentiate between personal and cor-
porate responsibility (Brammer et al. 2007).
Most major religions teach the value of charity. Bud-
dhism, for example, teaches an important concept of com-
passion, meaning sympathy or willingness to bear others’
pain. Buddhism eschews purely material pleasures and
focuses instead on social and environmental responsibility in
production, distribution, and exchange (Norberg-Hodge
1997). Taoism’s keystone Dao De Jing includes the apho-
rism: ‘‘virtuous accumulation can leave nothing undone.’’
Virtuous accumulation includes all merciful deeds, espe-
cially philanthropy. Most obviously, religious institutions
play a large role in humanitarian aid work. For example, after
the massive earthquake in Sichuan in 2008, Chinese resi-
dents were deeply impressed by clerics who contributed so
much to alleviate public suffering. In fact, business owners
who are located in areas that have more religious sites are
likely to be reminded that religion has some value in that
area, and that corporate philanthropy may enhance the firm’s
reputation and generate goodwill. Thus, firms that are loca-
ted in areas where generosity is a prevalent social norm may
choose to make more charitable donations.
Of course, one might argue that directors or/and man-
agers are the decision makers, and they may be nonbe-
lievers and thus are less influenced by religious teachings.
Nevertheless, when employees, customers, employers, and
suppliers in the surrounding region embrace moral/social/
religious norms, corporate leaders must be responsive
(e.g., El Ghoul et al. 2012b). Therefore, being located in
areas that have strong religious social norms does exert
1 Famous religious sites attract travelers. For example, Buddhist
meditation has inspired meditation tourism in Thailand, Hong Kong,
and Japan, attracting many to monasteries in their quests for self-
realization and spiritual enlightenment. Religious tourism positively
affects religious loyalty, drawing even non-adherents. In other words,
religious tourism promotes religious teachings and attracts the general
public.
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some influence (Kennedy and Lawton 1998), contagiously
spreading benevolence.2 Thus, religious social norms can
influence even non-adherents through their desire to con-
form socially. Because religious activities and people are
concentrated in areas of religious sites, they generate a
strong pervasive religious atmosphere, influencing philan-
thropic behavior through the norms and obligations of the
social network. Corporate directors and/or managers in
such areas receive religious edification imperceptibly and
tend to be more generous to enhance the firm’s reputation
and generate goodwill. Therefore, we predict that firms
located in religious areas are more likely to engage in
philanthropic giving, leading to our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 Ceteris paribus, religion is positively
associated with corporate philanthropic giving.
Hypothesis 1 predicts that religion and corporate phil-
anthropic giving have a positive association. However, the
ultimate owners of firms may differ in nature, which may
attenuate the religious influence on philanthropic decisions.
The reasons are as follows:
First, Gao et al. (2012) argue that China has not yet been
able to achieve an efficient separation between business
entities and government agencies. In fact, it is well-known
that the Chinese central and/or local government has strong
administrative force influencing corporate decisions. Some
government officials, as the ultimate owners of SOEs,
abuse their power and regard corporate philanthropic giv-
ing as a subordinate responsibility. Ironically, the Web
has coined a new popular saying: ‘‘forced to donate’’
(‘‘Bei Juan’’ in Chinese). Therefore, we infer that some
SOEs have passive, involuntary attitudes toward philan-
thropic giving. In comparison, for non-SOEs, corporate
philanthropic giving tends to be voluntary and strategic for
enhancing reputation, gaining popularity, increasing mar-
ket share, and improving future financial performance (File
and Prince 1998; Patten 2008; Maas and Liket 2011).
Therefore, for SOEs, government or officials, rather than
religious factors, are likely to affect philanthropic behavior.
Second, SOE top managers (chairmen, CEOs, and
directors, etc.) are always Chinese Communist Party
members who tend to have atheist views. However, non-
SOE top managers are far less likely to be Chinese Com-
munist Party members. Rationally deducing that religious
belief at the top will influence attitudes, we expect SOEs
and non-SOEs to show differences in philanthropic giving.
Finally, SOE managers and/or directors are semi-officials
who value their career progress rather than business ethics
when making corporate decisions on corporate philanthropic
giving. Thus, their decisions on corporate philanthropic
giving are rarely the outcome of religious influence.
Overall, we can conclude that religious influence on
corporate philanthropic giving is more pronounced for non-
SOEs than for SOEs, inspiring the second hypothesis in an
alternative form:
Hypothesis 2 Ceteris paribus, the positive association
between religion and corporate philanthropic giving is
weaker (less pronounced) for SOEs than for non-SOEs.
Empirical Models Specification and Variables
The Potential Endogeneity Between Corporate
Philanthropic Giving and Religion
Extant studies address concerns that religion and corporate
behavior may potentially be endogenous (e.g., Hilary and
Hui 2009; El Ghoul et al. 2012b). Similarly, we cannot rule
out endogeneity between religion and corporate philan-
thropic giving because firms may choose to locate in
peaceful places. Firms that have high levels of philanthropic
giving may also want to locate in highly religious regions to
obtain support from labor, production inputs, customers, and
suppliers (Loughran and Schultz 2005; Loughran 2007; John
et al. 2011; El Ghoul et al. 2012b; Du 2012).
To control for this potential endogeneity problem, we
must estimate the relation between corporate philanthropic
giving and religion in the simultaneous setting. Therefore,
we estimate the first-stage OLS regression:
RELIGION ¼ c0 þ c1GIVINGþ c2LNTAX
þ c3INCOME PC þ c4TRANSPORT
þ c5LNGDPþ c6CENTER
þ Exogenous variblesð Þ þ Year Dummies
þ Industry Dummiesþ U ð1Þ
In Eq. 1, RELIGION is the dependent variable, measured
as the number of religious sites within a certain radius around
Chinese listed firms’ registered addresses. GIVING denotes
the level of corporate philanthropic giving (See the sections
‘‘The Measurement of Religious Variables’’ and ‘‘The
Measurement of Corporate Philanthropic Giving’’ for more
details, similarly hereinafter).
Considering the importance of a firm’s registered address,
or corporate location, in defining our religious variables, we
must investigate factors influencing location decisions and
religious variables. Referring to prior literature, we identify
five factors that influence corporate location decisions and
thus are suitable as our instrumental variables: (1) tax
2 Hilary and Hui (2009) also provide strong evidence that firms
located in counties with higher religiosity display lower risk exposure.
Dyreng et al. (2012), Grullon et al. (2010), and McGuire et al. (2012)
also show the impact of religion on accounting risks, lawsuits,
restatements, and accrual management. McGuire et al. (2012) note
that religious social norms are important for mitigating agency
conflicts in contemporary corporations.
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purposes (LNTAX), measured as the natural logarithm of
total provincial tax (in million RMB) (El Ghoul et al. 2012b;
Du 2012; Stack and Kposowa 2006); (2) labor costs
(INCOME_PC), the natural logarithm of provincial income
per capita (Tomes 1985; Arano and Blair 2008); (3) cus-
tomers and suppliers (TRANSPORT), the natural logarithm
of the total mileage of highway and railway at the province
level (in km) (Loughran and Schultz 2005; Loughran 2007);
(4) regional development level (LNGDP), equaling the nat-
ural logarithm of GDP per capita at the province level (John
et al. 2011; McCleary and Barro 2006; Barro and McCleary
2003); (5) regulation (CENTER), measured as the natural
logarithm of the distance (in km) between listed firms and the
nearest financial centers of Beijing, Shanghai, or Shenzhen
(El Ghoul et al. 2012a). Moreover, following Herrera and
Minetti (2007) and Newey (1987), we also include all control
variables in Eqs. 2 and 3 as exogenous variables in Eq. 1.
The two-stage regression analysis procedure greatly
depends on using good instruments. Following Larcker and
Rusticus (2010), we conduct diagnostic tests to examine
whether instruments in the first-stage equation (i.e., Eq. 1)
are appropriate. Non-tabulated results show, first, to estimate
the two-stage OLS-Tobit regression procedure, we must
identify instruments that satisfy two conditions: the instru-
ments are (1) important to determine a firm’s location and
thus religious variables; and (2) less likely to be correlated
with residuals from the regression of corporate philanthropic
giving. Second, endogenous variables and the instrument
variables are highly correlated, ranging from 33.08 to
51.82 %, and significant at 1 % level. Third, over-identifi-
cation tests do not reject the appropriateness of the instru-
ments. Finally, non-tabulated Hausman tests reject the null
hypothesis of no endogeneity for measurement of religious
variables. Overall, these additional tests can mitigate the
possibility of weak instrumental variables in our two-stage
OLS-Tobit specifications.
Empirical Model Specification for Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1 predicts that religion is positively associated
with corporate philanthropic giving. In our study, we
employ Eq. 1 and the following Eq. 2 (Tobit regression) in





þa14GDP PCþ Year Dummies
þ IndustryDummies þ e ð2Þ
In Eq. 2, GIVING is the dependent variable, measured as
the amount of corporate philanthropic giving deflated by
total assets at the beginning of the year; RELIGION is the
main independent variable and denotes firm-level religious
variables. According to our Hypothesis 1, a1 is expected to
be significantly positive.
Following previous literature (e.g., Ullmann 1985;
Useem 1988; McGuire et al. 1988; Roberts 1992; Wang
and Coffey 1992; Meznar and Nigh 1995; Johnson and
Greening 1999; Williams 2003; Brammer and Millington
2006; Brown et al. 2006; Amato and Amato 2007, 2012;
Zhang et al. 2009, 2010; Jia and Zhang 2011; Du 2012), we
introduce control variables: (1) Considering SOEs and non-
SOEs as two types of ultimate owners of Chinese listed
firms, we introduce a dummy variable of STATE to dis-
criminate between them. An examination of Chinese firms’
responses to the 2008 Sichuan earthquake showed that
SOEs were less likely to respond (Zhang et al. 2009). (2)
FIRST, BDSHR, and INSTSHR are the percentages of
ownership owned by the largest shareholder, board mem-
bers, and institutional investors, respectively. (3) BOARD,
GENDER, and PLU are three variables controlling corpo-
rate governance structures and characteristics of the board
of directors. In particular, BOARD is the natural logarithm
of the number of the board of directors. GENDER is the
percentage of women on the board of directors, equaling
the number of women directors to the number of the board
of directors. PLU is an indicator variable that equals 1 if
the board director is also the CEO and 0 otherwise. (4)
Normally, firms with abundant cash have more flexibility
in corporate philanthropic giving. Hence, CASH is calcu-
lated as cash and equivalents deflated by total assets at the
beginning of the year. (5) LEV is the leverage ratio, mea-
sured as total liabilities scaled by total assets. (6) Firm size
is also a key factor because a recent study disputes com-
mon knowledge and maintains that medium-size firms give
more (Amato and Amato 2007). Therefore, we include the
variable of SIZE, measured as the natural logarithm of total
assets, in Eq. 2 because prior studies (e.g., Useem 1988;
Meznar and Nigh 1995; Brammer and Millington 2006;
Amato and Amato 2007) find that firm size is significantly
positively associated with corporate philanthropic giving.
(7) We control firm performance (ROA) as well, because
philanthropy and firms’ bottom line have mutual and per-
plexing relationships (McGuire et al. 1988; Roberts 1992).
(8) Firms with low expanding rate may be strategically
more conservative and more attentive to stakeholders. Thus
we add GROWTH, for growth prospects. (9) We include
the variable of GDP_PC, measured by the growth rate of
GDP per capita at the provincial level, into Eq. 2 to control
the influence of regional development extent on corporate
philanthropic giving. (10) Finally, we introduce year and
industry dummies into Eq. 2 to control year effects and
industry effects, respectively. All variable definitions are
presented in Appendix.
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Empirical Model Specification for Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 predicts that the positive association between
religion and corporate philanthropic giving is attenuated
for SOEs. To examine whether the nature of ultimate
owners attenuates the influence of religion on corporate
philanthropic giving, we introduce the interactive item
between RELIGION and the indicator variable of STATE
and construct the following Eq. 3. Furthermore, we employ
Eqs. 1 and 3 in a simultaneous setting to test Hypothesis 2:
GIVING ¼ b0 þ b1RELIGION þ b2RELIGION  STATE
þ b3STATE þ b4FIRST þ b5BDSHR
þ b6INSTSHRþ b7BOARDþ b8GENDER
þ b9PLU þ b10CASH þ b11LEV þ b12SIZE
þ b13ROAþ b14GROWTH þ b15GDP PC
þ Year Dummiesþ Industry Dummies þ w
ð3Þ
In Eq. 3, STATE is a dummy variable, equaling 1 when
the ultimate owner is a central or local government-
controlled SOE, and 0 otherwise (Zhang et al. 2009, 2010).
If the coefficient on ‘‘RELIGION 9 STATE’’ (i.e., b2) is
negative and significant, our empirical evidence supports
Hypothesis 2. In Eq. 3, control variables are the same as
those in Eq. 2, and all variable definitions are presented in
Appendix.
The Measurement of Religious Variables
Previous research use US data to derive county-level reli-
giosity indexes: the American Religion Data Archive by
the Glenmary Research Center (Hilary and Hui 2009) or
Gallup nationwide survey data (McGuire et al. 2012). But
China has no such data. Unlike other theists, Buddhists and
Taoists do not attend regular weekly religious services,
making it difficult to estimate the frequency of religious
observations.3 Moreover, religious research in China is in
its infancy, and authoritative statistics are scant. To counter
this problem, we refer to Du (2012) and construct a simple
and objective measure as an alternative.
Some US studies define a firm’s location as the place
where a firm’s headquarters are most often located (e.g.,
Hilary and Hui 2009). Similarly, we use the firm’s regis-
tered address, usually where the business initially started
and most often the headquarters. Moreover, we investigate
only Buddhist and Taoist impacts, not only because they
are predominant, but also because our study is hampered by
the lack of data of other religions. Furthermore, it is
unfeasible to count all religious sites, large or small,
notable or unknown. China has approximately 6,000
Buddhist monasteries and 1,000 Taoist temples (Chen
2003). Therefore, we identify some nationally famous
Buddhist monasteries and Taoist temples based on a list
issued by the State Council in 1983, which includes 141
Buddhist monasteries and 21 Taoist temples. We count the
number of Buddhist monasteries and Taoist temples in this
list within a defined kilometer radius around the firm’s
registered address in the digital map provided by Google.
In particular, following Du (2012), we report the pro-
cedure of variable construction: (1) Using ‘‘Google-earth’’
we obtain the longitude and latitude of every firm-year
observation in our sample according to its registered
address, respectively. (2) Similarly, we check the geo-
graphic location of every religious site, and then fix its
longitude and latitude. (3) We calculate the distance
between a firm and every religious site according to their
longitudes and latitudes, equaling the length of the minor
arc across the surface of the earth (Rising 2000). Finally,
we use 200 and 300 km as the distance criteria (the upper
limits)4 to define RELIGION200 and RELIGION300 by
identifying the number of nationally famous religious sites
and measure our main independent variables, respectively.
We argue that there are two meritorious features of our
approach. First, this measure is objective. It is hard to
assert people’s spiritual status, so the survey information,
especially information from interviews, inevitably suffers
some bias. While some survey resources provide us with
some useful insights, there is frequently incongruence
between interviewees’ claims and actual thoughts.
Accordingly, our measure is more objective. Second, it is
quasi firm-level, religious variable, rather than a province-
level one. Prior US studies use county-/region-/metropoli-
tan-level religious measures and thus may give rise to the
curiosity that firms within one area are alike in religiosity.
Our measure can relatively display some variation of reli-
giosity among different firms in a province. Of course, our
3 Monks or clergies cannot derive accurate statistics about the
numbers of religious believers in their assemblies because so many
attend services. More importantly, many religious people are
conservative and discreet. Persecution during the Cultural Revolution
made them feel unsafe about communicating their religious beliefs
publically. Therefore statistics are unavailable to reveal the number of
religious believers.
4 We choose 200 and 300 km as the distance criteria to calculate the
number of religious sites famous nationwide and measure religious
variables for the following reasons: (1) Following Du (2012) and
Rising (2000), we view every province or municipality as approx-
imately circular and calculate the average approximate radius to be
about 234.05 km. (2) ‘‘Higher index of ‘standard deviation/mean’
indicates acuter relative discrete degree of random variables on the
mean, and thereof it is more unsuitable to choose related distances as
the criteria to define religious variables’’ (Du 2012). Therefore, we
calculate the index of ‘‘standard deviation/mean’’ and find it greater
than 1 when the distance criterion exceeds 200 km. Therefore, we
choose 200 and 300 km as the distance criteria.
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measure of religiosity may fail to fully capture the under-
lying spiritual status of Chinese people.
The Measurement of Corporate Philanthropic Giving
To measure the variable of GIVING, we use annual
financial statements for collecting data on corporate phil-
anthropic giving. According to China’s accounting stan-
dards, corporate philanthropy, as a sub-item of non-
operating expenses, includes cash and goods donations.
Some studies have focused on firms’ reactions to catas-
trophes, such as the Sichuan earthquake in 2008 (e.g., Gao
et al. 2012; Zhang et al. 2009). In contrast, our measure-
ment places more weight on long-term philanthropic
activities, including low-profile cases of large contributions
and persistent charitable activities.
In previous studies, GIVING is measured as: (1) the
natural logarithm of the amount of corporate philanthropic
giving (Zhang et al. 2010); (2) the amount of corporate
philanthropic giving deflated by total assets at the begin-
ning of the year (Brown et al. 2006; Useem 1988; Meznar
and Nigh 1995; Brammer and Millington 2006; Amato and
Amato 2007, 2012); (3) the amount of corporate philan-
thropic giving deflated by sales revenue (Williams 2003;
Chen et al. 2008); (4) the amount of corporate philan-
thropic giving deflated by pre-tax income/profit in the year
(Wang and Coffey 1992; Ullmann 1985; McGuire et al.
1988; Roberts 1992).
To measure the variable of GIVING and conduct our
main tests, we adopt the second method, the amount of
corporate philanthropic giving deflated by total assets at the
beginning of the year, because: (1) organizational size
theory of CSR argues that firm size and industry are two
key factors influencing corporate philanthropic giving, and
(2) prior studies provide strong evidence that firm size is
the most important factor in corporate philanthropic giving
(Useem 1988; Meznar and Nigh 1995; Brammer and
Millington 2006; Amato and Amato 2007). For example,
Useem (1988), Meznar and Nigh (1995), and Brammer and
Millington (2006) argue that firm size is the only important
factor dominating the level of corporate philanthropic
giving and larger firms tend to respond positively to cor-
porate philanthropy. Furthermore, Amato and Amato
(2007, 2012) find that firm size and philanthropic giving
show a nonlinear relation. Overall, extant studies have
constructed a close link between corporate philanthropy
and firm size, strongly supporting our measure of GIVING,
i.e., the amount of corporate philanthropic giving deflated
by total assets at the beginning of the year.5
Sample and Descriptive Statistics
Identification of Sample
Panel A of Table 1 summarizes the sample selection pro-
cess. Our initial sample includes all listed firms in 19
provinces and 4 municipalities of mainland China for the
period of 2004–2010.6 We begin with 11,154 firm-year
observations7 and then exclude observations for (1) firms in
the finance and insurance industry because of their differ-
ent balance sheet structures, (2) firms that issue shares to
foreign investors, termed B- or H-shares, because their
financial characteristics and regulatory environments differ
from those of firms issuing only domestic A-shares, (3)
firms with negative assets, (4) ST (special treatment) firms
because they operate under various trading and financial
restrictions, (5) firms with unavailable data for measuring
firm-specific control variables.
Finally, we obtain a sample of 6,866 observations with
1,288 unique firms. We winsorize the top and bottom 1 %
of each variable to control the influence of some extreme
observations.8
Table 1, Panel B, displays the sample distribution by
year and industry. As it shows, year or industry clustering
is not severe in our study. Appendix includes the data
source of all variables.
Discussion on Sample Selection
We cannot rule out sample selection bias. Lack of corpo-
rate philanthropic giving data for our sample firms means
either they failed to give or failed to report their donations.
It is difficult to distinguish one from the other, so we use a
‘‘reduced form’’ approach (Hall and Oriani 2006) where a
single Probit equation describes the probability of observ-
ing philanthropic giving. For brevity, we report non-tabu-
lated results as the Eq. 4:
5 Our main conclusions are not qualitatively changed using other
measures of GIVING as the dependent variable.
6 We omit firms located in five autonomous regions (Xinjiang, Tiebt,
Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, and Ningxia) because the temples listed are
in the Han area. We also eliminate firm-year observations in Gansu,
Hainan, and Qinghai because these provinces have no nationally
famous religious sites. If we view those regions and provinces as
having low religiosity and include them in our sample, the results are
not qualitatively changed.
7 The results remain qualitatively similar if we include firm-year
observations based on criteria (2)–(4) and introduce three dummy
variables (i.e., ST, Negative assets, and CROSS) into regressions.
8 The results are not qualitatively changed by deleting the top and the
bottom 1% of the sample, no deletion, or no winsorization.
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In Eq. 4, the dependent variable is a dummy variable
(GIVINGDUM), equal to 1 if corporate philanthropic
expenditures are reported and 0 otherwise. The main
independent variable is GIVING_IND, i.e., industry-level
philanthropic giving, measured as the amount of industry-
level philanthropic giving deflated by total industry reve-
nues. We include both industry-level and firm-level control
variables in Eq. 4: (1) GROWTH_IND is industry-level
revenues growth rate, equaling (industry sale revenue in
year t - industry sale revenue in year t - 1) divided by
industry sale revenue in year t. (2) TOBIN’Q is defined as
market value of assets over book value of assets and equals
to the number of shares tradable 9 stock price at the end of
year t ? the number of shares non-tradable 9 net assets
per share ? total liability at the end of year t (Zhang et al.
2009, 2010). (3) FIRST, SIZE, LEV, ROA, and GROWTH
are firm-level financial variables (see Appendix for
definitions).
As shown in Eq. 4, the coefficient on GIVING_IND is
positive and significant at the 1 % level (1.8389 with
t = 15.39), suggesting that industry-level philanthropic
giving is significantly positively associated with the like-
lihood that a firm will disclose its donations. This result
means that our sample has no serious sample selection bias.
Moreover, GIVINGDUM is significantly positively (nega-
tively) associated with SIZE, LEV, and ROA (FIRST and
GROWTH).
Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlation Analysis
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of variables in
our study. The mean of GIVING is 0.2149, showing that the
amount of corporate philanthropic giving accounts for
about 0.02 % of firms’ total assets. This number is sig-
nificant in Chinese listed firms. Moreover, based on the
descriptive statistics result of GIVING, we can infer that it
does not obey the standard normal distribution.
The mean (median) values of RELIGION200 and
RELIGION300 are 9.9650 and 17.6059 (9.0000 and
14.0000), with standard deviations of 7.6406 and 12.6060,
suggesting 9.9650 (17.6059) nationally famous religious
sites within 200 km (300 km) radius around the firm’s
registered address, on average. Moreover, about 63.31 %
of Chinese listed firms’ ultimate owners are central/local
government or government-controlled SOEs.
As for control variables in Eqs. 2 and 3, descriptive sta-
tistics results in Table 2 also reveal: (1) The average per-
centage of the largest shareholding is about 38.07 %. (2) The
mean (media) value of BDSHR is about 0.0264 (0.00), sug-
gesting that the average percentage of shares owned by
corporate board members is low at 2.64 %. (3) The variable
of INSTSHR has a mean value of 0.1807, indicating that the
average ratio of shares owned by institutional investors is
about 18.07 %. (4) The mean value of BOARD is 2.2119,
suggesting that nine directors are universal. (5) The variable
of GENDER has a mean value of 0.1399, meaning an average
13.99 % ratio of women directors. (6) The variable of PLU
has a mean value of 0.1365, indicating that the same person
serves as CEO and chairman of the board for about 13.65 %
of Chinese listed firms. (7) The mean value of CASH is
0.1992, meaning that the ratio of the cash and equivalents to
total assets at the beginning of the year is about 19.92 %. (8)
The variable of LEV has a mean value of 0.4902, displaying
that the average financial leverage is 49.02 %. (9) The mean
value of SIZE is 21.5154 with a standard deviation of 1.0221,
suggesting a substantial variation in firm size. (10) The
variable of ROA has a mean (median) value of 0.0366
(0.0338), meaning a relatively poor accounting performance
for firm-years in our sample. (11) The variable of GROWTH
has a mean value of 0.2261 with a standard deviation of
0.4446, suggesting a big gap in growth rate. (12) The mean
value of GDP_PC is 0.1575, indicating that the growth rate
of province-level GDP per capita is 15.75 % on average.
As for variables in Eq. 1: (1) LNTAX has a mean value
of 11.3982, suggesting that the average provincial tax is
about 85.16 billion RMB. (2) The mean value of
INCOME_PC is 10.1915, indicating the average province-
level income per capita is about 26,675 RMB. (3) The
mean value of TRANSPORT is 7.1603, reflecting the
average total mileage of highway and railway at the
ð4Þ
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province level. (4) LNGDP has a mean value of 10.1909,
suggesting that the average province-level GDP per capita
is about 26,660 RMB. (5) The mean value of CENTER is
5.1378, indicating that the average distance between a
listed firm and the nearest financial center (Beijing,
Shanghai, or Shenzhen in China) is about 170.34 km.
Table 3 reports the Pearson correlation among the vari-
ables. The p value is in parentheses below the coefficient. As
expected, our measure of corporate philanthropic giving
(i.e., GIVING) is significantly negatively associated with
religious variables, i.e., RELIGION 200 and RELIGION300
at the 5 % level, tentatively supporting Hypothesis 1.
Moreover, STATE is significantly negatively associated with
GIVING at the 1 % level, and RELIGION 200 and RELI-
GION300 are significantly negatively related with STATE.
These results reveal that the nature of controlling
Table 1 Sample selection procedure and sample distribution
Panel A: Sample selection procedure
Initial observations from 2004 to 2010 11,154
Eliminate observations pertaining to the banking, insurance, and other financial industries (136)
Eliminate observations who issue shares to foreign investors (termed B-shares or H-shares) (876)
Eliminate observations whose net assets or shareholders equity are below zero (437)
Eliminate observations whose transaction status are ST,*ST or PT (599)
Eliminate observations whose data required to measure firm-specific control variables are not available (2,240)
Remaining firm-year observations 6,866
Unique firms 1,288
Panel B: sample distribution by year and industry
Industry codes Years
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 % Total
A 15 17 16 18 19 17 20 1.78 122
B 16 18 17 19 22 23 22 2.00 137
C0 32 32 33 35 38 40 38 3.61 248
C1 35 40 41 49 51 47 49 4.54 312
C2 0 1 2 1 2 4 3 0.19 13
C3 15 18 17 24 24 23 27 2.16 148
C4 105 114 104 108 117 113 117 11.33 778
C5 27 31 34 39 47 54 48 4.08 280
C6 81 82 80 84 95 86 94 8.77 602
C7 131 151 142 157 174 182 181 16.28 1,118
C8 53 69 66 67 70 71 71 6.80 467
C9 11 12 11 13 16 15 16 1.37 94
D 38 45 43 42 43 35 44 4.22 290
E 17 19 22 26 28 27 28 2.43 167
F 35 36 36 37 42 38 39 3.83 263
G 58 63 54 60 66 72 78 6.57 451
H 71 73 72 72 72 74 76 7.43 510
J 29 32 34 35 37 38 37 3.52 242
K 27 28 29 32 37 36 38 3.31 227
L 7 7 6 6 7 7 7 0.68 47
M 52 55 50 48 48 46 51 5.10 350
% 12.45 13.73 13.24 14.16 15.37 15.26 15.79 100
Total 855 943 909 972 1,055 1,048 1,084 6,866
A agriculture, forestry, husbandry and fishery, B mining, C0 food and beverage, C1 textile, garment manufacturing and products of leather and
fur, C2 wood and furniture, C3 papermaking and printing, C4 petroleum, chemical, plastics, and rubber products, C5 electronics, C6 metal and
non-metal, C7 machinery, equipment and instrument manufacturing, C8 medicine and biological products manufacturing, C9 other manufac-
turing, D production and supply of electricity, steam and tap water, E construction, F transportation, and warehousing, G information technology,
H wholesale and retail, J real estate, K social services, L communication and culture, M conglomerates
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shareholders plays a possible moderating role on the
association between religion and corporate philanthropic
giving, preliminarily supporting Hypothesis 2. That is,
Pearson analysis results suggest that we should test the
joint effects of RELIGION 200 (RELIGION300) and
STATE on GIVING.
Next, we turn to the Pearson correlation between cor-
porate philanthropic giving and control variables. GIVING
is significantly positively associated with BDSHR,
INSTSHR, PLU, CASH, SIZE, ROA, and GROWTH, and
GIVING displays a significantly negative relation with
FIRST, and LEV. These results suggest a need to control
these variables when we examine the influence of religion
on corporate philanthropic giving in multivariate regres-
sions, discussed in the next section.
As for the Pearson correlation among the variables used
in Eq. 1 (i.e., the first-stage OLS regression), RELIGION
200 (RELIGION300) is significantly positively (negatively)
related with LNTAX, INCOME_PC, and LNGDP
(TRANSPORT and CENTER) at the 1 % level, suggesting
that the five instrumental variables are appropriate.
Finally, as expected, the coefficients of pair-wise cor-
relation among other control variables of Eqs. 2 and 3 in all
models are generally low, suggesting no multicollinearity
problem when these variables are included together in the
regressions.
Empirical Results
Table 4 reports the first-stage OLS regression and the
second-stage Tobit regression results. All reported t values
are adjusted for clustered standard errors (Petersen 2009)
(similarly hereafter). Moreover, we also compute sample-
size adjusted t value to overcome the problem of overstated
significance (Lindley 1957; Easton and Faff 1994;
McKenzie and Faff 2005; Connolly 1989; Chatrath et al.
2006). Note that the critical value is 2.964 based on the
equation ((s - k)0.5(s1/s - 1)0.5). In Table 4, we mark the
significance on the estimated coefficients. Moreover, we
also mark the letter ‘‘a’’ on t values to denote cases where
the t value exceeds the critical value (2.964 in our study)
and the estimated coefficients are significant at 5 % level at
least (similarly hereafter).
The First-Stage OLS Regression Results
As for regression results of the first-stage OLS regression,
as shown in Columns (1) and (4) of Table 4: (1) The
coefficients on LNTAX are negative and significant at 1 %
level, suggesting that corporate location and thus religiosity
is significantly negatively associated with higher total
provincial tax, consistent with Stack and Kposowa (2006).
(2) The variables of INCOME_PC have significantly
Table 2 Descriptive statistics
Variable N Mean SD Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
GIVING(91000) 6,866 0.2149 0.4840 0.0000 0.0000 0.0196 0.1788 3.0584
RELIGION200 6,866 9.9650 7.6406 0.0000 3.0000 9.0000 18.0000 30.0000
RELIGION300 6,866 17.6059 12.6060 0.0000 6.0000 14.0000 26.0000 45.0000
STATE 6,866 0.6331 0.4820 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
FIRST 6,866 0.3807 0.1558 0.0894 0.2558 0.3627 0.5013 0.7498
BDSHR 6,866 0.0264 0.0938 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.5373
INSTSHR 6,866 0.1807 0.1891 0.0000 0.0258 0.1127 0.2820 0.7419
BOARD 6,866 2.2119 0.2040 1.6094 2.1972 2.1972 2.3026 2.7081
GENDER 6,866 0.1399 0.0999 0.0000 0.0600 0.1200 0.2000 0.4400
PLU 6,866 0.1365 0.3433 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
CASH 6,866 0.1992 0.1555 0.0078 0.0919 0.1576 0.2606 0.8483
LEV 6,866 0.4902 0.1825 0.0723 0.3582 0.5039 0.6288 0.8628
SIZE 6,866 21.5154 1.0221 19.4125 20.7848 21.4265 22.1306 24.4714
ROA 6,866 0.0366 0.0556 -0.1876 0.0135 0.0338 0.0613 0.1968
GROWTH 6,866 0.2261 0.4446 -0.6363 0.0148 0.1603 0.3426 2.8030
GDP_PC 6,866 0.1575 0.0524 0.0333 0.1234 0.1663 0.1932 0.2730
LNTAX 6,866 11.3982 0.8412 9.3294 10.7128 11.4784 12.1280 12.8488
INCOME_PC 6,866 10.1915 0.3996 9.3667 9.9219 10.2114 10.4229 11.0992
TRANSPORT 6,866 7.1603 0.7875 5.5759 6.6690 7.0103 7.8372 8.5080
LNGDP 6,866 10.1909 0.6101 8.3703 9.7092 10.2257 10.7064 11.2395
CENTER 6,866 5.1378 1.8140 -1.0096 4.4946 5.7918 6.4538 7.3391
This table reports some descriptive analysis results. Please see Appendix for variable definitions. We winsorize the top and bottom 1 % of each of
the continuous variables to exclude the effect of outliers
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positive coefficients in Columns (1) and (4), which can
borrow support from Arano and Blair (2008) and Tomes
(1985). (3) The coefficients on TRANSPORT in Columns
(1) and (4) are significantly negative at the 1 % level,
suggesting that corporate location and thus religiosity is
inversely related with the status of province-level transport.
(4) The coefficient on LNGDP in Column (4) is positive
and significant at the 1 % level, echoing McCleary and
Barro (2006) and Barro and McCleary (2003). (5) The
variables of CENTER in Columns (1) and (4) have sig-
nificantly positive coefficients, suggesting that corporate
location in higher religiously intense areas is always far
from financial centers. El Ghoul (2012a) can lend support
to this finding.
Multivariate Test of Hypotheses 1 and 2
Next, we turn to the second-stage Tobit regression results.
Because the dependent variable of corporate philanthropic
giving (i.e., GIVING) does not obey the standard normal
distribution,9 Columns (2) and (5) (Columns (3) and (6)) of
Table 4, in which RELIGION200* and RELIGION300*,
are the predicted values from the first-stage OLS regres-
sion, present the second-stage Tobit regression results of
Hypothesis 1 (Hypothesis 2), respectively.
Columns (2) and (5) show that the coefficients on
RELIGION200* and RELIGION300* are positive and
significant at the 1 % level (0.0054 with t = 5.30 and
0.0020 with t = 2.81, respectively), providing support to
Hypothesis 1. Furthermore, the estimated coefficients mean
that when RELIGION200 (RELIGION300) increases one
unit of standard deviation, corporate philanthropic giving
increases about 4.13 % (2.52 %), equaling about 19.22 %
(11.73 %) of the mean value of GIVING. Therefore, these
coefficient estimates are economically significant. More-
over, the magnitude of the coefficients on RELIGION200
and RELIGION300 tend to decline, meaning that the
positive association between religion and corporate phil-
anthropic giving becomes weaker when we relax the dis-
tance criterion from 200 to 300 km.
As reported in Columns (3) and (6), the coefficients on
RELIGION200* and RELIGION300*, which capture the
influence of religion on philanthropic giving for non-SOEs,


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































9 Following Shapiro and Wilk (1965), Shapiro and Francia (1972),
and D’Agostino et al. (1990), we conduct three tests to examine
whether corporate philanthropic giving in our sample obeys the
standard normal distribution, respectively. Our results show that the
null hypothesis that ‘‘corporate philanthropic giving in our sample
obeys standard normal distribution’’ is rejected at the 1% level
regardless of used test approaches (z = 19.38, z = 2.76, and
v2 = 5317.66 for Shapiro–Wilk test, Shapiro–Francia test, and
Skewness–Kurtosis test, respectively).
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t = 9.42 and 0.0232 with t = 10.39, respectively), lending
additionally strong and robust support to Hypothesis 1. The
estimated coefficients mean that for non-SOEs, when the
number of religious sites within 200 (300) km radius
around a firm’s registered address increases one unit, cor-
porate philanthropic giving increases about 4.19 %
(2.32 %), equaling about 19.50 % (7.96 %) of the mean
value of GIVING, respectively. Obviously, these amounts
are economically significant. Similarly, the magnitude of
the coefficients on RELIGION200 and RELIGION300 also
tend to decline.
More importantly, the coefficients on RELIGION200* 9
STATE and RELIGION300* 9 STATE are negative and
significant at the 1 % level (-0.0630 with t = -7.65 and
-0.0360 with t = -8.22, respectively), suggesting a
weaker, less-pronounced positive association between reli-
gion and corporate philanthropic giving for SOEs than for
non-SOEs. This result is consistent with Hypothesis 2. Fur-
thermore, the absolute magnitude of the coefficient on
RELIGION200* 9 STATE (|-0.0630|) is greater than that of
the coefficient on RELIGION300* 9 STATE (|-0.0360|):
the state nature of ultimate owners less attenuates the posi-
tive association between religion and corporate philan-
thropic giving when we relax the distance criterion from 200
to 300 km.
Moreover, as expected, the coefficients on STATE are
significantly negative in Columns (2)–(3) and (5)–(6).
Furthermore, corporate philanthropic giving in SOEs is
significantly lower than that in non-SOEs, ranging from
9.09 to 13.07 % depending on different regression models.
These results are consistent with extant literature (e.g.,
Zhang et al. 2009, 2010).
As for control variables in Columns (2)–(3) and (5)–(6):
(1) The variables of FIRST in Columns (2) and (5) have
significantly negative coefficients, meaning that higher
shares owned by controlling shareholders lead to signifi-
cantly lower philanthropic giving. (2) The coefficients on
BDSHR are significant at the 1 % level across all cases,
indicating that higher percentage of shares owned by the
board of directors is significantly associated with corporate
philanthropic giving. (3) The coefficients on GENDER in
Columns (2), (3), and (6) are negative and significant at the
1 % level, meaning that higher ratio of women managers
leads to less philanthropic giving, inconsistent with Jia and
Zhang (2011). (4) The variables of CASH have signifi-
cantly positive coefficients, suggesting that firms with
higher cash holdings at the beginning of the year tend to
donate more. (5) The coefficients on LEV in Columns (2)
and (5) are positive and significant at the 1 % level, con-
sistent with Brown et al. (2006). (6) The variables of SIZE
have significantly positive coefficients across all cases,
suggesting that larger firms pay more attention to social
responsibility and donate more than do smaller firms,
consistent with Johnson (1966) and Brammer and Mil-
lington (2006). (7) The coefficients on ROA are positive
and significant at the 1 % level, consistent with these
findings in Ullmann (1985) and McGuire et al. (1988). (8)
Except for those cases, we find no significant relations
between GIVING and other variables such as INSTSHR,
PLU, GROWTH, and GDP_PC.
Robustness Checks
Robustness Checks Using Different Religious Variables
To address whether our results in Table 4 are robust to
alternative proxies for the religious variables, we relax and
tighten the geographical parameter to identify the number
of nationally known Buddhist monasteries and Taoist
temples within other defined kilometers radius around the
firm’s registered address. In particular, we define RELI-
GION 220, RELIGION 240, RELIGION 250, RELIGION
260, and RELIGION 280, respectively, and conduct
robustness checks. We report only the second-stage Tobit
regression results and omit the first-stage OLS regression
result for brevity.
Columns (1)–(5) of Table 5 show that the coefficients
on RELIGION220*, RELIGION240*, RELIGION250*,
RELIGION260*, and RELIGION280* are positive and
significant across all cases, which provides strong and
robust support to Hypothesis 1 again. These results suggest
that religion is significantly positively associated with
corporate philanthropic giving.
Columns (6)–(10) of Table 5 display that the coeffi-
cients on RELIGION220* 9 STATE, RELIGION240* 9
STATE, RELIGION250* 9 STATE, RELIGION260* 9
STATE, and RELIGION280* 9 STATE are all negative and
significant at the 1 % level, which is consistent with our
Hypothesis 2, and suggests that the state nature of ultimate
owners attenuates the positive association between religion
and corporate philanthropic giving. Moreover, as expected,
the coefficients on all religious variables and STATE are sig-
nificantly positive and significantly negative, respectively.
Results in Table 5 are indistinguishable when compared
with those in Table 4. As for control variables in Table 5,
the signs and significances are qualitatively similar to those
in Table 4.
Further Tests Using an Alternative Proxy
for the Dependent Variable
To address whether our main regression results are robust,
we re-estimate Eqs. 2 and 3 using another dependent
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variable GIVING, measured as the amount of corporate
philanthropic giving deflated by net income in the year
(Wang and Coffey 1992; Ullmann 1985; McGuire et al.
1988; Roberts 1992), borrowing support from slack
resource theory of CSR.10 Panel A of Table 6 reports the
second-stage regression results for brevity.
Columns (1) and (3) of Panel A show that the coeffi-
cients on RELIGION200* and RELIGION300* are signif-
icantly positive at the 1 % level, additionally supporting
Hypothesis 1. Moreover, results in Columns (2) and (4)
show that the coefficients on RELIGION200* 9 STATE
and RELIGION300* 9 STATE are significantly negative at
the 1 % level, meaning that Hypothesis 2 stands.
Robustness Checks Using Reduced Sample Excluding
Observations in the Year of 2008
The unreported descriptive results show that the number of
firms engaging in philanthropic giving increases mono-
tonically over the years and suddenly ascends in 2008, the
year of the Wenchuan earthquake in Sichuan province. In
2008, 83.20 % of Chinese listed firms reported philan-
thropic giving, significantly higher than the 59.68 % for the
other years of our sample period from 2004 to 2010.
Eliminating 1,055 observations in 2008, the reduced sam-
ple comprises 5,811 observations, and the second-stage
regression results are presented in Panel B of Table 6.
Columns (1) and (3) of Panel B show that the coeffi-
cients on RELIGION 200* and RELIGION300* are posi-
tive and significant at the 1 % level, additionally
supporting Hypothesis 1 and again recognizing the signif-
icantly positive association between religion and corporate
philanthropic giving. Columns (2) and (4) indicate that the
coefficients on RELIGION200* 9 STATE and RELI-
GION300* 9 STATE are negative and significant at the
1 % level, consistent with Hypothesis 2.
Robustness Checks Based on Firm-Year Observations
Before 2004
Next, we re-estimate Eqs. 2 and 3 using firm-years before
our sample period (2004–2010) for balanced panel data
(El Ghoul et al. 2012a, 2012b; Du 2012). The remaining
firms have relatively longer histories and more stable






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































10 We also conduct two other robustness checks: (1) GIVING is
measured as the amount of corporate philanthropic giving, the natural
logarithm of the amount of corporate philanthropic giving (Zhang
et al. 2009); and (2) GIVING is measured as the amount of corporate
philanthropic giving deflated by sale revenue (Williams 2003; Chen
et al. 2008). Our unreported results are qualitatively similar to those in
Table 4.
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Columns (1) and (3) of Panel C show that the coefficient
on RELIGION 200* and RELIGION300* are positive and
significant at the 1 % level, consistent with Hypothesis 1.
Columns (2) and (4) show that the coefficients on RELI-
GION200* 9 STATE and RELIGION300* 9 STATE are
significantly negative at the 1 % level, additionally sup-
porting Hypothesis 2.
Overall, results in Table 6 are strong and robust, and
these checks produce statistically indistinguishable results
compared with our model in the main tests. Therefore,
the findings in Table 6 corroborate that religion is pos-
itively associated with corporate philanthropic giving,
and the association is weaker for SOEs than for non-
SOEs.
Conclusions
We conduct this study to examine religion’s role in shaping
Chinese listed firms’ philanthropic giving activities. We
follow recent studies that investigate the presence of reli-
gion in corporate decisions and firms’ valuations (e.g., El
Ghoul et al. 2012b; Hilary and Hui 2009; McGuire et al.
2012). More specifically, we construct quasi-firm-level
religious variables using a digital map. Then we explore
whether the proximity of religious sites and corporate
philanthropic giving are linked. Our findings reveal that
religion is significantly positively associated with corporate
philanthropic giving. Moreover, the positive association is
less pronounced for SOEs than for non-SOEs. Our results
are robust to various measures of religion and various
sensitivity tests.
Our study makes several contributions to the business
ethics literature. First, we illuminate the influence of reli-
gion on corporate philanthropy. Contemporary China has
seen a dramatic religious revival. Meanwhile charities are
becoming more widespread. Public firms are increasingly
realizing that they should value CSR. The resurgence of
religious influence prompts us to wonder whether religion
would impact corporate philanthropic giving. Intuitively,
we expect a naturally positive relationship because almost
all religions teach the value of selflessness. Our study
supports that religion does positively impact corporate
philanthropic giving.
Second, our study explores the interactive effect between
religion and administrative force on corporate philanthropy
in China. Our findings reveal that religion, acting as a social
norm, exerts significant and positive impact on corporate
philanthropy. However, the nature of ultimate owner, as
proxy for administrative force, negatively influences cor-
porate philanthropic giving. Furthermore, the nature of
ultimate owner attenuates the positive association between
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contribute to the controversy about the competitive influence
between administrative force and religion.
Finally, throughout much of the economic reform period
of the late twentieth century, China focused on economic
development. Now that China has become the world’s
second largest economy, Chinese people are beginning to
seek more than economic advancement. Religion encour-
ages the faithful to be compassionate toward others, and
thus helps counter difficulties. In addition, the Chinese
government desires a ‘‘harmonious society,’’ and realizes
religion’s role in attaining that goal. Thus, the government
has made some attempts to support traditional Chinese
Table 6 Other robustness checks of Hypotheses 1 and 2 (the second-stage Tobit regression)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Second stage [Eq. (2) and H1] Second stage [Eq. (3) and H2] Second stage [Eq. (2) and H1] Second stage [Eq. (3) and H2]
Coefficient t value Coefficient t value Coefficient t value Coefficient t value
Panel A: Robustness checks of Hypotheses 1 and 2 based on corporate philanthropic giving deflated by total profit
RELIGION200* 0.1818*** (5.54)a 1.0017*** (8.46)a
RELIGION300* 0.0786*** (3.80)a 0.5704*** (8.87)a
RELIGION200* 9 STATE -1.4129*** (-7.36)a
RELIGION300* 9 STATE -0.8346*** (-7.82)a
STATE -1.4811* (-1.72) -0.6411 (-0.74) -1.5358* (-1.78) -0.6181 (-0.72)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Intercept -29.0976*** (-3.27)a -56.0333*** (-4.94)a -28.4454*** (-3.22)a -55.7673*** (-5.05)a
Number of obs. 6,866 6,866 6,866 6,866
Pseudo_R2 0.0211 0.0218 0.0210 0.0219
Left censored 2,652 2,652 2,652 2,652
Log likelihood -19,029.02*** -19,015.12*** -19,031.73*** -19,014.75***
Panel B: Robustness checks of Hypotheses 1 and 2 based on reduced sample excluding the year of 2008
RELIGION200* 0.0057*** (6.45)a 0.0407*** (8.31)a
RELIGION300* 0.0023*** (4.00)a 0.0228*** (8.84)a
RELIGION200* 9 STATE -0.0605*** (-7.13)a
RELIGION300* 9 STATE -0.0348*** (-7.47)a
STATE -0.0924*** (-3.15)a -0.0591** (-2.08) -0.0942*** (-3.19)a -0.0568** (-2.01)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Intercept -1.5314*** (-5.15)a -2.6588*** (-6.92)a -1.5096*** (-5.22)a -2.6313*** (-6.97)a
Number of obs. 5,811 5,811 5,811 5,811
Pseudo_R2 0.0930 0.0961 0.0926 0.0962
Left censored 2,468 2,468 2,468 2,468
Log likelihood -4,240.34*** -4,226.02*** -4,242.28*** -4,225.43***
Panel C: Robustness checks of Hypotheses 1 and 2 based on firm-year observations that had existed before our sample period (2004-2010)
RELIGION200* 0.0057*** (4.68)a 0.0458*** (8.51)a
RELIGION300* 0.0019** (2.16) 0.0247*** (9.36)a
RELIGION200* 9 STATE -0.0630*** (-6.94)a
RELIGION300* 9 STATE -0.0355*** (-7.65)a
STATE -0.1089*** (-2.69) -0.0829** (-2.11) -0.1100*** (-2.71) -0.0779** (-1.97)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Intercept -1.5587*** (-5.64)a -2.7257*** (-9.33)a -1.5235*** (-5.66)a -2.6755*** (-9.26)a
Number of Obs. 6,143 6,143 6,143 6,143
Pseudo_R2 0.1244 0.1271 0.1240 0.1270
Left censored 2,452 2,452 2,452 2,452
Log likelihood -4,694.97*** -4,680.41*** -4,697.01*** -4,681.22***
Note: All control variables, year dummies, and industry dummies are included in all regression models but not reported here for brevity. The values of t statistics are
in parentheses, and ***,** and * represent the 1, 5 and 10 % levels of significance, respectively, for a two-tailed test. All reported t statistics are based on standard
errors adjusted following Petersen (2009). Moreover, because of our relatively large sample size, we also compute the size-adjusted t statistic, and the 5 % critical
t value is measured as (s - k)0.5(s1/s - 1)0.5. s = sample size and k = the number of parameters estimated, including the intercept. Please note that the 5 % critical
values are about 2.964, 2.935, and 2.945 in Panel A (N = 6,866), Panel B (N = 5,811), and Panel C (N = 6,143), respectively. Following Lindley (1957), Easton
and Faff (1994), McKenzie and Faff (2005), Connolly (1989), and Chatrath et al. (2006), we also mark the letter ‘‘a’’ on t values to denote that t value exceeds the
critical values and the estimated coefficients are significant at 5 % level at least. Please see Appendix for variable definitions
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practices such as encouraging ancestor worship and
changing public holidays. This trend indicates that reli-
gions will continue to develop in China, benefitting both
adherents and the nation as a whole.
Our study, of course, has its limitations. First, following
Du (2012), we measure religious variables as the number of
nationally famous religious sites within a certain radius
around a listed firm’s registered address. China has a
number of religious sites, but our study includes only 162
nationally famous religious sites because of data limita-
tions. Second, our study investigates only religious influ-
ence on corporate philanthropic giving based on Buddhism
and Taoism, but we do not examine the impacts of other
religions such as Islam, Catholicism, and Protestantism on
corporate philanthropic giving in China, also because of
data limitations.
Lastly, the research on how religion influences the Chi-
nese economy is quite sparse. In essence, research on religion
is just beginning. We hope that our highlighted area will be
explored later by more in-depth research. We look forward to
gathering more empirical findings and developing theory
between religion and corporate philanthropic giving based
on more authoritative, plentiful statistics. Moreover, we call
for more detailed studies on the competitive influence of
different religions on corporate philanthropic giving.
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Appendix: variable definitions
Variable Definition Data source
GIVING The amount of philanthropic giving, deflated by total assets at the beginning of the year




RELIGION200 The number of nation-widely famous Buddhist monasteries and Taoist temples within a
200 km radius around the firm’s registered place (Du 2012)
Author’s calculation (A’C)
RELIGION300 The number of nation-widely famous Buddhist monasteries and Taoist temples within a
300 km radius around the firm’s registered place (Du 2012)
Author’s calculation (A’C)
RELIGION200* The predicted values of RELIGION 200 from the first-stage OLS regression (i.e., Eq. 1) Eq. 1 in this study
RELIGION300* The predicted values of RELIGION 300 from the first-stage OLS regression (i.e., Eq. 1) Eq. 1 in this study
STATE A dummy variable, which equals 1 if the ultimate shareholder is central or local
government(s) or government-controlled SOEs, and it equals 0 otherwise (Zhang et al.
2009, 2010)
Author’s calculation (A’C)
GENDER The ratio of women directors in the board of directors, equaling to the number of women
directors to the number of the board of directors (Williams 2003; Jia and Zhang 2011)
Author’s calculation (A’C)
based on CSMAR
BDSHR Shares owned by members in the board of directors (Johnson and Greening 1999) CSMAR
INSTSHR Shares owned by institutional investors (Johnson and Greening 1999) CSMAR
FIRST The percentage of ownership owned by the largest shareholder (Johnson and Greening 1999) CSMAR
BOARD The natural logarithm of the number of board (Williams 2003; Wang and Coffey 1992) CSMAR
PLU Dummy variable, which equals to 1 if the director of the chairman is also the CEO and 0
otherwise (Johnson and Greening 1999)
CSMAR
CASH The cash and equivalents deflated by total assets in the beginning of the year (Zhang et al.
2009, 2010)
CSMAR
LEV The debt-to-asset ratio, equaling to total liability deflated by total assets (Brown et al. 2006) CSMAR
SIZE The natural logarithm of total assets (Useem 1988; Meznar and Nigh 1995; Brammer and
Millington 2006; Amato and Amato 2007, 2012)
CSMAR
ROA The return on total asset, equaling to net income deflated by total assets (Ullmann 1985;
McGuire et al. 1988; Roberts 1992)
CSMAR
GROWTH The growth rate of revenue, equaling to (sale revenue in year t - sale revenue in year t - 1)/
sale revenue in year t
CSMAR
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